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Abstract
We show that large retailers, competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower
range, can exercise market power by pricing below cost some of the products also
offered by the smaller rivals, in order to discriminate multi-stop shoppers from one-
stop shoppers. Loss leading thus appears as an exploitative device rather than
as an exclusionary instrument, although it hurts the smaller rivals as well; banning
below-cost pricing increases consumer surplus, rivals’ profits, and social welfare. Our
insights extend to industries where established firms compete with entrants offering
fewer products. They also apply to complementary products such as platforms and
applications.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have seen the prevalence of large supermarkets, which attract
consumers through one-stop shopping. More recently, the retail industry has also featured
a substantial increase in concentration — due in part to zoning regulations which, by
limiting their internal growth, have encouraged retail chains to merge and to acquire
independent stores. As a result, large supermarkets often dominate local retail markets,1
in which they mainly compete with much smaller stores.2
A key feature of this asymmetric retail competition is that large stores offer a wide
range of products, whereas smaller stores focus on narrower product lines on which they
can offer better value. Specialist retailers such as wine cellars, fruit and vegetable stores,
and traditional bakeries, offer for instance higher quality or more services. Another ex-
ample is provided by hard discount chains,3 which offer limited selections of basic goods,4
and moreover rely on private labels and a no-frills approach to minimize operating costs;
this low-cost business model allows them to offer prices that are up to 60% lower than
those of leading name brands, and 40% lower than large retailers’ own labels.5
While large retailers can exert their market power in various ways,6 the recent litera-
1In the UK, where the number of supermarket chains went from 7 to 4 within a few years, the
Competition Commission reported that 27% of larger grocery stores were located in "highly-concentrated
local markets", defined as those with three or fewer fascias, including one with more than 60% of grocery
sales within a 10-minute drive-time; see Competition Commission (2008) at pp. 107-108.
2In France, where large retailers have stores exceeding 10,000 sq. mt. (up to 24,000+ sq. mt. for
Carrefour), zoning regulations have limited the size of new entrants to 300 sq. mt. (now 1,000 sq. mt.).
3There are more than 35000 discount stores in Europe, and their share of the grocery market already
exceeds 26% in Germany and 34% in Norway; the leading hard-discount chains, Aldi and Lidl, operate
over 13,000 stores and account for more than 50% of the discount sales in Europe — see Cleeren et al.
(2010) at p. 457. In the U.S., where the hard discount format has emerged more recently, in January 2011
Aldi had already opened more than 1,135 stores (in the name of Trade Joe’s or Aldi) in 30 states, and
another price-aggressive grocery discounter, Save-A-Lot, operated more than 1,200 stores in 39 states —
see "Thrifty grocery shoppers head to smaller Save-A-Lot, Aldi", USA Today, 1/25/2011.
4According to Steenkamp and Kumar (2009, p.2), hard discouters typically offer 1,000 to 1,500 SKUs,
whereas a US supermarket "sells 30,000, on average, and a Wal-Mart supercenter sells 100,000."
5See for example Cleeren et al. (2010); Sachon (2010) and Steenkamp and Kumar (2009) also provide
detailed accounts of the hard discount retail format.
6See Dobson and Waterson (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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ture on retail power has mostly focused on buyer power (against suppliers) rather than on
seller power (against consumers and smaller rivals). Yet, policy debates suggest that the
latter may have the most profound market effects.7 One of these debates has centered on
loss leading, a practice commonly adopted by large retailers that consists of pricing below
cost some of the competitive products (leader products). In the UK, for example, in its
first sector inquiry the Competition Commission, noting that "nearly all the main parties
sold a small number of products at prices below the cost of purchase", expressed the
concern that loss leading "may have a predatory impact on small and specialist retailers"
and limit the growth of particular retailers such as hard discounters; yet in its second
inquiry it dismissed the concern and argued instead that loss leading "may represent ef-
fective competition between retailers and may benefit consumers by reducing the average
price for a basket of products".8 In Germany, the highest court upheld in 2002 a decision
of the Federal Cartel Office enjoining WalMart to stop selling basic food items (such as
milk and sugar) below its purchase cost, confirming that a firm "with superior market
power in relation to small and medium-sized competitors" should not price below cost.9
By contrast, OECD (2007) argues that rules against loss leading are likely to protect
inefficient competitors and harm consumers. A similar discrepancy appears in below-cost
resale statutes.10
In the economic literature, loss leading has been viewed as an advertising strategy
adopted to attract consumers who are imperfectly informed of prices;11 however, this may
7See for example the reports of the US Federal Trade Commission (2001, 2003), the proceedings of the
FTC conference held on May 24, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/grocery/index.shtm, or the
groceries market enquiries of the UK Competition Commission (2000, 2008) recommending the adoption
of codes of practices. In France, two Acts adopted in 1996 aimed at curbing the expansion of large
retailers as well as their market power.
8See, respectively, Competition Commission (2000) at p. 131 and p. 132, and (2008) at p. 9.
9See http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/d3382527-7acd-45c6-bae6-
4ef14157e415/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/007af760-21b4-46b0-b356-
a96612caf3cf/International%20Competition%20Law%20Update12-2-02.pdf
10In the US, 22 states are equipped with general sales-below-cost laws, and 16 additional states prohibit
below-cost sales on motor fuel. In the EU, below-cost resale is banned in Belgium, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, whereas it is generally allowed in the Netherlands and the UK. See
Skidmore et al. (2005) and Calvani (2001).
11Lal and Matutes (1994), for example, consider a situation where multi-product firms compete for
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be less relevant for routine grocery shopping, where consumers seem to be reasonably
aware of prices.12 Loss leading has also been interpreted as optimal cross-subsidization
by a multi-product monopolist facing different demand elasticities across products;13 in
practice, however, the choice of leader products appears driven by the competition from
smaller stores on specific goods.14 Yet little attention has been devoted to the potential
adverse effect on smaller rivals and consumers. And while it may be tempting to treat
loss leading as predatory pricing, the persistence of below-cost sales over time does not
fit well with a scenario in which the predator would recoup the losses incurred during the
predation phase by raising the prices afterwards, once rivals have been pushed out of the
market.
This paper aims at filling this gap. We develop a model of asymmetric competition
between large and small stores. We abstract away from the above-mentioned efficiency
justifications by assuming that consumers are perfectly informed of all prices and by
allowing for homogeneous consumer valuations for the goods. Our key modelling feature
is instead to account for the heterogeneity in consumers’ shopping costs: some consumers
face higher shopping costs, e.g., because of tighter time constraints or lower taste for
consumers who are initially unaware of prices, and find that in equilibrium firms may indeed choose to
advertise loss leaders in order to increase store traffic. Ellison (2005) analyzes add-on pricing, and shows
that loss leading can be optimal when firms only advertise base goods.
12See e.g. Competition Commission (2008), stating at p. 98 that consumers’ price comparisons "depend
not only on the price of a selection of known-value items (KVIs), but also on the basket price", and that
loss leading is "unlikely to mislead consumers in relation to the overall cost of shopping".
13Bliss (1988) already views loss leading as a cross-subsidizing strategy, but does not formally establish
existence conditions. Beard and Stern (2008) allow for continuous consumer demands and show that loss
leading can indeed arise although for rather specific demand functions. Ambrus and Weinstein (2008)
study symmetric competition for one-stop shoppers, and show that loss leading can arise only when
consumer demand is elastic and exhibits rather specific forms of complementarity.
14Loss leaders are mainly staples such as milk and dairy, alcohol, bread and bakery products that
consumers purchase repeatedly and regularly — and which constitute the core product lines of small
outlets such as hard-discount stores. In its 2000 report, the UK Competition Commission mentions at
p. 131 that "we were told that the main cause of negative gross margins was market pressure [...] Asda
told us: ‘The focus of the discounters on limited lines has enabled them to deliver lower prices and has
forced the national retailers to respond. This response primarily has taken the form of the introduction of
budget ranges across almost all categories.’ Consequently below-cost selling is most obvious on economy
lines. [...] This raises the concern that the discounters may be adversely affected by this practice."
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shopping, and thus have a stronger preference for one-stop shopping, whereas others have
lower shopping costs and can therefore benefit from multi-stop shopping.15
We first present the main insights in a stylized setting where consumers have homo-
geneous valuations over the range of products offered by a large retailer which, on some
of the goods (the competitive segment), faces a fringe of smaller but more efficient rivals.
Consumers with low shopping costs then buy the monopolized goods from the large re-
tailer and the competitive goods from the small stores. Consumers with higher shopping
costs can choose between buying the full range from the large retailer, or buying only the
competitive goods from the smaller rivals. We show that the large retailer adopts a loss
leading strategy whenever its broader range allows it to win the competition for these
one-stop shoppers: by pricing the competitive goods below cost, and raising the price for
the monopolized goods accordingly, the large retailer can maintain the total price charged
to one-stop shoppers, while increasing the margin earned on multi-stop shoppers in the
monopolized segment. Thus, while the presence of the smaller rivals may generate a com-
petitive pressure, it also allows the large retailer to discriminate consumers according to
their shopping costs, and this is best achieved through loss leading — when the compara-
tive advantage conferred by its broader range is large enough, the large retailer can obtain
even more profit than in the absence of the smaller rivals.
We then extend the analysis to the case where the large retailer faces a strategic
rival rather than a competitive fringe, in which case loss leading also hurts the rival by
reducing its market share and squeezing its profit margin.16 However, this margin squeeze
appears here as a by-product of consumer exploitation rather than driven by exclusionary
motives; indeed, it is the very presence of a rival, offering better terms on some products,
that allows the large retailer to screen consumers according to their shopping costs. Yet,
the lack of exclusionary intent, as well as the fact that the small retailer remains active,
should not lead to the conclusion that loss leading is an innocuous strategy, since it hurts
both consumers and rivals. We show that a ban on loss leading would discipline the large
retailer and benefit consumers as well as the small rival, and would also increase social
welfare by improving the distribution efficiency in the competitive segment.
15Stassen et al. (1999, p. 373) concludes from the US Progressive Grocer Reports (1990-1997) that
roughly 75% of grocery shoppers regularly visit more than one store each week; see also Gijsbrechts et
al. (2008).
16See for example Dobson (2002).
4
We also show that loss leading still arises in more general settings with heterogeneous
consumer valuations for the goods, product differentiation in the competitive segment,
and (imperfect) competition among large retailers. The exploitative use of loss leading
thus appears to be a robust feature in market environments where a few large retailers
enjoy substantial market power over one-stop shoppers and compete with rivals that focus
on narrower product lines, where they benefit from lower costs or better quality.
While this paper has been motivated by loss leading in the retail industry, its in-
sights apply to a variety of situations where: (i) a firm enjoys substantial market power
in one market and faces tough competition in other markets; (ii) dealing with a single
supplier gives customers some benefits (e.g. due to scale economies, lower adoption or
maintenance costs, etc.), which vary across customers. Pricing below cost in the compet-
itive markets then allows the larger firm to screen customers more effectively and extract
part of the benefits. This insight can shed a new light on antitrust cases such as IBM
and Microsoft ;17 while the debates mainly focused on exclusionary purposes, our analysis
suggests an alternative conceptual framework based instead on exploitation.
This paper can also be related to the literature on bundling and tying (particularly for
IT goods which have negligible production costs, where both loss leading and bundling
amount to giving the product for free). Part of this literature focuses on the use of (possibly
mixed) bundling to enhance price discrimination in monopoly or oligopolistic markets.18
Building on this literature, Armstrong and Vickers (2010) consider a symmetric duopoly
in which consumers that "mix and match" incur an additional shopping cost; they show
that, while prices remain above (or at) cost, mixed bundling tends to raise profit at the
expense of consumers. Another part of the literature has focused instead on the use of
tying as an entry deterrence device, e.g. by committing to fiercer competition in case of
entry or by reducing the value of entering into a single market.19 By contrast, here loss
leading has little impact on the total price at which large firms offer their bundles, and is
not intended to be exclusionary; instead, it primarily increases the price charged on the
less competitive segment to those consumers who have lower shopping or adoption costs.
17See e.g. United States v. International Business Machines Corporation, Docket number 69 Civ. DNE
(S.D. NY) and United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1232 TPJ (D.C.).
18See e.g. Adams and Yellen (1976) and Matutes and Regibeau (1988).
19See e.g. Whinston (1990), Nalebuff (2004), Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Choi and Stefanadis
(2001); Rey and Tirole (2007) offer a review of this literature.
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2 Loss leading as an exploitative device
We present here the main intuition in a stylized setting in which a large retailer (L),
supplying a broad range of products, competes with a fringe of smaller retailers (S) that
focus on a narrower product line. For the sake of exposition, we simply assume that
there are two markets (which can be interpreted as different goods or product lines): A is
monopolized by L, whereas B can be supplied by L and S. Consumers desire at most one
unit of A and one unit of B;20 to rule out cross-subsidy motives based on demand elasticity
differences as in Bliss (1988), we further assume here that consumers have homogeneous
valuations.
Consumers incur a shopping cost s for visiting a store, which reflects the opportunity
cost of the time spent in traffic, parking, selecting products, checking out, and so forth;
it may also account for the consumer’s taste for shopping. Our key modelling feature,
reflecting the fact that consumers may be more or less time-constrained, or value their
shopping experience in different ways, is that the shopping cost s varies across consumers.
2.1 A simple example
A numerical example can illustrate the intuition. Suppose that L can supply A at no
cost and B at unit cost c = 4, while consumers value A at uA = 10 and B at uB = 6.
Suppose further that half of the consumers face a high shopping cost s = 4, whereas the
others can shop at no cost. If L were alone, it would supply all consumers at a total price
(slightly below) pm = uA + uB − s = 12, yielding a monopoly profit Πm = 12− 4 = 8:21
L would thus extract all surplus from high-cost consumers but leave the others a surplus
of 4, reflecting the difference in shopping costs.
Suppose now that B is also offered by a competitive fringe S at a price pˆ = 2. S
cannot attract high-cost consumers, who would obtain uB − pˆ − s = 0; L can therefore
still charge them a total price of pm. L could for example price B at cost (pB = 4) and
charge the rest on A (pA = 8): L would then sell A only to low-cost consumers (who
become "multi-stop shoppers" and buy B from S) and yet obtain the monopoly margin
20The assumption of unit demands appears reasonable for groceries and other day-to-day consumer
purchases. To be sure, price changes affect the composition of consumer baskets, but are less likely to
have a large impact on the volume of purchases for staples.
21Selling only to low-cost consumers at a total price p = 16 yields a lower profit (16− 4) /2 = 6 < Πm.
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on both types of consumers: pm − c = pA = 8. However, the presence of the small rivals
opens a door for screening consumers according to their shopping costs, and this is best
achieved by selling B below cost; keeping the total price equal to pm, lowering the price for
B down to pˆ = 2, and increasing the price for A to pˆA = 10, does not affect the shopping
behavior of high-cost consumers (who still face a total price of pm), but increases the
margin earned on multi-stop shoppers (since pˆA > pA). This loss-leading strategy thus
allows L to charge the monopoly price to one-stop shoppers, and actually extracts here
the full value of A from multi-stop shoppers;22 as a result, it earns a total profit Π = 9,
which is greater than in the absence of S.
2.2 Baseline model
We now consider more general supply and demand conditions, and in particular allow
L and S to offer different varieties in the competitive market, BL and BS. We denote
by uA, uL and uS the consumer valuations for A, BL and BS, and by cA, cL and cS the
(constant) unit costs. Small retailers supply BS at cost (pS = cS), thus offering consumers
a value wS ≡ uS − cS, and are more efficient than L in this segment (otherwise, S would
not sell anything, and multi-stop shopping would never arise): wS > wL ≡ uL− cL (> 0);
for instance, S can include chained, cost-cutting hard-discounters (cS < cL), or specialist
stores that offer better quality or more service (uS > uL). L however benefits from
its broader range (wA ≡ uA − cA > 0), and may overall offer a higher or lower value:
wAL ≡ wA + wL ≷ wS. Finally, we allow for general distributions of the shopping cost
s, characterized by a cumulative distribution function F (·) and a density function f (·).
Intuitively, consumers with a high s favor one-stop shopping, whereas those with a lower
s can take advantage of multi-stop shopping; the mix of multi-stop and one-stop shoppers
is however endogenous and depends on L’s prices, pA and pL.
Let rAL ≡ pA − cA + pL − cL denote L’s total margin and vAL ≡ uA + uL − pA − pL =
wAL − rAL denote the consumer value from purchasing A and BL. One-stop shoppers
prefer L to S ("regime L") as long as vAL ≥ wS, and are indeed willing to patronize L as
long as s ≤ vAL; however, consumers favor multi-stop shopping if the additional cost of
22This is the best L can achieve with low-cost shoppers, who are willing to pay at most pˆ < c for B.
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visiting S is lower than the extra value it offers, which we will denote by τ :
s ≤ τ ≡ wS − (wL − rL) ,
where rL ≡ pL − cL denotes L’s margin on BL.
s
τ0
Multi-stop 
shoppers
buy  at ,   at  SA L B S
ALv
One-stop 
shoppers
buy  and  at  LA B L
Figure 1: Regime L
Thus, in regime L (see Figure 1),23 L attracts a demand F (vAL)−F (τ) for both products
(from one-stop shoppers) and an additional demand F (τ) for product A only (from multi-
stop shoppers); it thus obtains a profit equal to:
rAL (F (vAL)− F (τ)) + rAF (τ) = rALF (vAL)− rLF (τ) ,
where rA ≡ pA− cA = rAL− rL denotes L’s margin on A. Since vAL = wAL− rAL and τ =
wS−wL+rL, this profit expression is additively separable in rAL and rL; the optimal pric-
ing policy in regime L thus consists in maximizing rALF (vAL) = rALF (wAL − rAL) w.r.t.
rAL, subject to vAL = wAL − rAL ≥ wS, and minimizing rLF (τ) = rLF (wS − wL + rL)
w.r.t. rL. But the latter obviously leads to rL < 0, that is, to selling BL below cost.
We thus obtain our first insight:
Lemma 1 It is optimal for L to adopt a loss-leading strategy whenever it chooses to
attract one-stop shoppers (regime L).
The intuition is quite simple. Keeping the total margin rAL constant, reducing rL
allows L to increase the margin rA it charges on A; this does not affect the overall margin
on one-stop shoppers (who buy both A and B), but enhances the margin on multi-stop
shoppers (who only buy A). While the move also transforms some multi-stop shoppers
(who initially buy BS from S) into one-stop shoppers (who now turn to BL), this, too,
23Appendix A shows that prices leading to τ < 0 (resp., τ > vAL) are equivalent to prices yielding
τ = 0 (resp., τ = vAL); therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to τ ∈ [0, vAL].
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benefits L as long as one-stop shoppers are more profitable, that is, as long as rL > 0.
L thus finds it optimal to keep reducing rL until selling BL below cost.
Loss leading thus arises whenever it is optimal for L to attract one-stop shoppers, and
the optimal subsidy then balances a favorable impact on rA against an adverse effect on
the mix of multi-stop shoppers (who become more profitable than one-stop shoppers when
rL < 0). To characterize further the optimal pricing strategy, in what follows we assume
that the inverse hazard rate, h (·) ≡ F (·) /f (·), is strictly increasing. This ensures the
quasi-concavity of L’s profit function, and the optimal margin thus satisfies the first-order
condition (we only sketch the reasoning here, and provide a formal analysis in Appendix
A)24
r∗L = −h(τ ∗) < 0; (1)
using τ = wS − (wL − rL), the optimal threshold τ ∗ is characterized by
τ ∗ ≡ l−1(wS − wL) > 0, (2)
where l(s) ≡ s+ h(s) is increasing in s.
In the absence of any restriction on its total margin rAL, L would maximize the
first term, rALF (vAL), which is the monopolistic profit that L could earn if S were not
present. This profit function is quasi-concave in rAL and the monopoly outcome is thus
characterized by the first-order condition:
rmAL = h(v
m
AL), (3)
which, using rmAL = wAL − vmAL, yields25
vmAL ≡ l−1 (wAL) ; (4)
the associated monopoly profit is ΠmAL ≡ rmALF (vmAL).
24For the sake of exposition we ignore here non-negativity price constraints. If the comparative ad-
vantage of S stems from lower costs, then wS − wL = cL − cS and (2) implies p∗L = cL + r∗L =
(cS + wS − wL) − h(τ∗) > cS + τ∗ > 0. However, if the comparative advantage of S comes from a
better variety, then it may be optimal for L to offer its own variety for free if the quality difference is
large and/or its cost is low.
25We implicitly assume away here any relevant upper bound on shopping costs. If s is instead distrib-
uted over a range [0, s¯], where s¯ ≤ l−1 (wAL), then the optimal (monopoly) value is v¯mAL = s¯ and the
corresponding profit is wAL − s¯.
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Conversely, this strategy does attract one-stop shoppers as long as vmAL ≥ wS (or
wAL ≥ l (wS)); therefore, when L derives a sufficiently large comparative advantage from
its broader product range, the optimal strategy consists of charging the monopoly margin
rmAL for the bundle, and r∗L = −h (τ ∗) for BL. The loss-leading strategy then gives L a
profit equal to:
Π∗L = r
m
ALF (v
m
AL)− r∗LF (τ ∗) = ΠmAL + h (τ ∗)F (τ ∗) ,
which exceeds the monopoly profit ΠmAL.
That L earns more profit than in the absence of L may at first seem surprising. But
when vmAL ≥ wS, the fringe does not exert any effective competition for one-stop shoppers,
and yet allows L to screen multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers. This screening is
moreover best achieved by adopting a loss leading strategy: pricing BL below cost allows
L to raise the margin rA above rmAL, and extract in this way some of the surplus that
multi-stop shoppers obtain from the more efficient S, while maintaining the monopoly
margin rmAL on one-stop shoppers.
When instead L’s comparative advantage is not large enough (namely, vmAL < wS), L
must improve its offer in order to keep attracting one-stop shoppers. It is then optimal
for L to match the value offered by the competitive fringe: v˜∗AL = wS, or r˜∗AL = wAL −
wS (< rmAL).
26 The loss-leading strategy then gives L a profit equal to:
Π˜∗L ≡ (wAL − wS)F (wS) + h (τ ∗)F (τ ∗) .
Alternatively, L can leave one-stop shoppers to the small retailers ("regime S") and
focus instead on multi-stop shoppers, who are willing to buy A from L as long as the
added value vA ≡ wA − rA exceeds the extra shopping cost s. In this way, L obtains:
ΠmA ≡ rmAF (vmA ) = maxrA rAF (wA − rA) .
The loss-leading strategy27 is clearly preferable when vmAL ≥ wS, since it then gives L
more profit than the monopolistic level ΠmAL (which itself exceeds ΠmA ). As it turns out,
it remains preferable as long as L enjoys a comparative advantage over S:
26If needed, L can slightly enhance its offer to make sure that it attacts all one-stop shoppers.
27Throughout the paper, we refer to loss leading as actually selling a product below cost. In regime S,
L may keep offering BL below cost when wAL < wS (e.g. by charging rL = −rmA ), but only sells A.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that L faces a competitive fringe of small retailers (S), and that
the inverse hazard rate h (s) strictly increases with s; then:
• Whenever L enjoys a comparative advantage over S (i.e., wAL > wS), its unique
optimal pricing strategy involves loss leading: L sells the competitive product BL
below cost. Furthermore, when its comparative advantage is large (namely, vmAL ≥
wS), L keeps the total margin for the two products at the monopoly level (rAL = rmAL)
and earns a higher profit than in the absence of any rivals; otherwise L’s total margin
simply reflects its comparative advantage (rAL = wAL − wS).
• When instead L faces a comparative disadvantage (i.e., wAL < wS), its unique
optimal pricing strategy consists of monopolizing the non-competitive product and
leaving the market of the competitive product to the small retailers.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Illustration: Uniform density of shopping costs. To illustrate this Proposition, suppose
that the shopping cost is uniformly distributed: F (s) = s. The monopoly profit, rALvAL =
rAL (wAL − rAL), is then maximal for rmAL = vmAL = wAL/2. Thus, as long as wAL ≥ 2wS,
offering the monopoly value suffices to attract one-stop shoppers (vmAL ≥ wS) and L’s
profit is given by:
rmALv
m
AL − rLτ = ΠmAL − rL (wS − wL + rL) ,
which is maximal for:
r∗L = −τ ∗ = −
wS − wL
2
< 0.
In this way, L obtains more than the monopoly profit:
Π∗L = Π
m
AL − r∗Lτ ∗ =
w2AL
4
+
(wS − wL)2
4
.
When instead 2wS > wAL > wS, L maintains the subsidy r∗L but can only charge r˜∗AL =
wAL − wS to one-stop shoppers; its profit reduces to:
Π˜∗L = (wAL − wS)wS +
(wS − wL)2
4
,
which coincides with
ΠmA =
(wAL − wL)2
4
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when wAL = wS. Finally, whenever wAL < wS, L leaves the competitive segment to its
smaller rivals and earns ΠmA by exploiting its monopoly power on A.
Remark: Bundled discounts. In principle, L could offer three prices: one for A, one for
BL and one for the bundle. But as L sells A to all of its customers, only two prices matter
here: the price pA charged for A to multi-stop shoppers, and the total price pAL charged
for A and BL to one-stop shoppers; since these prices can equivalently be implemented
through stand-alone prices, pA for A and pL ≡ pAL − pA for BL, offering an additional
bundled discount cannot improve L’s profit here.
Remark: Specialist stores versus hard discounters. As discussed before, two different
types of small retail formats may benefit from a comparative advantage in market B: hard
discount chains that focus on lower costs (but may offer a similar quality), and specialist
stores that offer higher quality (at possibly higher costs). In the latter case, however,
consumers may differ in their preferences for quality, and those who do not value quality
much may not be interested in multi-stop shopping even if they have low shopping costs.
Yet, as shown in Appendix E, loss leading arises as long as some consumers favor quality
over price.
Remark: Asymmetric shopping costs. In practice, a consumer may incur different costs
when visiting L or S — visiting a larger store may for example be more time-consuming.
Our analysis easily extends to such situations. If for example consumers bear a cost αs
when patronizing L (and s, as before, when visiting S), the threshold τ remains unchanged
but one-stop shoppers are now willing to patronize L whenever s < vAL/α; thus, as long
as L attracts one-stop shoppers, its profit is now:
ΠL = rALF
³vAL
α
´
− rLF (τ) ,
which leads L to adopt the same loss-leading strategy as before, r∗L = −h (τ ∗).
3 Loss leading and margin squeeze
Focusing on the case where the small retailer is a competitive fringe allows us to highlight
the exploitative effect of loss leading without considering its impact on the smaller rivals,
since competition among them dissipates their profits anyway. Yet, in many antitrust
cases, small retailers have complained that their margins were squeezed as a result of
large retailers’ loss-leading strategies. To analyze this margin-squeeze effect, we now
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consider the case where L competes against a single smaller rival S, which can thus earn
a positive margin rS > 0 on BS.
The previous analysis of L’s pricing behavior still applies, replacing the competitive
value wS with the net value offered by S, vS ≡ wS − rS. We will focus on the regime
where L attracts one-stop shoppers by offering a better value than its rival (regime L,
where vAL > vS). L then faces a demand F (vAL)−F (τˆ) on both products from one-stop
shoppers, and an additional demand F (τˆ) on product A from multi-stop shoppers, where
the gain from multi-stop shopping, τˆ , is now given by:
τˆ ≡ vS − vL = wS − wL + rL − rS. (5)
Maximizing its profit, ΠL = rALF (vAL)− rLF (τˆ), leads L to charge again the monopoly
margin for the bundle (rAL = rmAL) and to price the competitive good below cost, with a
subsidy satisfying rL = −h(τˆ).
Since S only attracts multi-stop shoppers, it obtains a profit ΠS = rSF (τˆ) and its
best response to rL is thus characterized by the first-order condition:
rS = h(τˆ).
The equilibrium margin rˆ∗L and rˆ∗S and the resulting threshold τˆ
∗ thus satisfy:
τˆ ∗ = wS − wL + rˆ∗L − rˆ∗S = wS − wL − 2h(τˆ ∗),
which yields
τˆ ∗ ≡ j−1(wS − wL), (6)
where j(s) ≡ s + 2h(s) is strictly increasing. In this candidate equilibrium, S earns a
profit
Πˆ∗S ≡ h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗) ,
while L obtains
Πˆ∗L ≡ ΠmAL + h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗) .
Since τˆ ∗ = j−1(wS − wL) < l−1(wS − wL) = τ ∗, L’s profit is lower than when it was
facing a competitive fringe of small retailers. For these margins to form an equilibrium,
two conditions must be satisfied: first, L must indeed attract one-stop shoppers; second,
S should not benefit from attracting one-stop shoppers, by offering a higher value than
vmAL (note that, as L earns more profit than a pure monopolist, it has no incentive to
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exclude S). Both conditions are obviously satisfied when vmAL > wS (≥ vS). We show in
Appendix B that, more generally, they hold when (and only when) L enjoys a significant
comparative advantage:
Proposition 2 Suppose that L faces a strategic smaller rival S. Then loss leading arises
in equilibrium if and only if wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL), where the threshold wˆAL (wS, wL) lies
above wS and increases with wS; conversely, in this range there is a unique Nash equilib-
rium, in which L sells the competitive product below-cost while keeping the total price for
both products at the monopoly level, and earns a profit higher than in the absence of the
rival.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Loss leading thus constitutes a robust exploitative device, which allows L to discrim-
inate multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers even when competing with a strate-
gic smaller rival. As before, adopting loss leading allows L to earn even more profit
than a pure monopolist if its comparative advantage is large enough. Compared with
the case of a competitive fringe, loss leading is now adopted in equilibrium only when it
allows L to earn the full monopoly margin from one-stop shoppers, but it does so in a
broader range of circumstances: it is shown in Appendix B that the equilibrium condition
wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL) is strictly less stringent than the condition vmAL ≥ wS.
The loss-leading strategy now reduces S’s profit, not only by decreasing its market
share, but also by squeezing its margin: S’s best response is rS = h (τˆ), where τˆ =
l−1 (wS − wL + rL) increases with rL. Yet, this appears here as a side effect of exploitation
rather than as the result of exclusionary motive. In particular, foreclosing the market
through strategic tying or (pure) bundling would not be profitable here, since L could
obtain at most the monopoly profit in the case of exclusion.
Remark: Strategic margin squeeze. Although margin squeeze appears here as a by-
product of exploitation, the large retailer has an incentive to manipulate its rivals’ prices:
the lower S’s price for BS, the more L can extract from multi-stop shoppers. Thus, if L
could move first and act as a Stackelberg leader, it would decrease even further its price
for BL, so as to force S to respond by decreasing its own price (in contrast with the
standard Stackelberg insight, where the leader usually benefits from higher rival prices)
and in this way allow L to raise its price on A for multi-stop shoppers.
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However, since L benefits from the presence of S, it may also want to tailor its loss-
leading strategy in order to maintain that presence. Suppose for example that the entry
of S is uncertain. It is then profitable for L to adopt a loss-leading strategy in case of
entry, in order to extract additional rents from multi-stop shoppers; however, this can
reduce the likelihood of entry, in which case L faces a trade-off between exploitation and
entry accommodation. We develop a simple model along these lines in Appendix C, which
yields the following insights:
Proposition 3 If L and S compete as Stackelberg leader and follower, then in the loss-
leading equilibrium L prices further below-cost than in the absence of the first-mover ad-
vantage. However, if the entry of S depends on the realization of a random entry cost,
then L limits instead the subsidy on B so as to increase the likelihood of entry.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark: complementary goods and adoption costs. While we have focused on indepen-
dent goods, the analysis also applies to the case where A and B are partially substitutable,
as well as — even more straightforwardly — to the case where they are complements. Sup-
pose for example that A is a prerequisite for using B (as in the case of CD players and
speakers): product B has no value on a stand-alone basis (uL = uS = 0), and must be used
together with product A (yielding utilities uAL and uAS, where wAS = uAS − cA − cS >
wAL = uAL − cA − cL). Interpreting wL and wS as wAL − wA and wAS − wA,28 the above
analysis goes through except that, since one-stop shoppers necessarily favor L (since
there is no value in patronizing S only), L always engages in loss leading: it charges the
monopoly margin rmAL for the bundle and an even greater margin rmAL + h (τ ∗) for A on a
stand-alone basis (reflecting the "subsidy" r∗L = −h (τ ∗) on BL).
Also, while we have focused so far on retail markets, the insights apply to industries in
which the costs of adopting a technology, of learning how to use a product, of maintaining
equipment, and so forth, play a role similar to the shopping costs that consumers incur
to visit an additional store. Indeed, the same analysis goes through, interpreting s as
the additional cost that customers must incur in order to use a rival application, rather
than that provided by the incumbent. These insights can, therefore, shed a new light on
28The analysis applies irrespective of whether A generates or not a value on a stand-alone basis, as
long as combining it with B generates a higher value.
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famous antitrust cases such as the Microsoft saga, in which Microsoft has been accused
of excluding rivals in adjacent markets — e.g., the markets for browsers or media players.
While the arguments mainly focused there on the rationality of an exclusionary conduct,
our analysis suggests an alternative motivation for subsidizing or otherwise encouraging
customers to adopt the platform developer’s own application, to the detriment of its rivals.
Similar insights also apply to industries in which procuring several categories of prod-
ucts from the same supplier allows a customer to save on operating costs. For example,
in its decision blocking the proposed merger between Aerospatiale-Alenia and De Hav-
illand,29 the European Commission mentions that the new entity would have benefited
from being the only one to offer regional aircraft in all three relevant sizes, thus allow-
ing "one-stop shopper" airlines to save on maintenance and spare parts as well as on
pilot training and certification. To see how the analysis can be transposed in such indus-
tries, suppose for instance that L covers both segments A and B while S covers B only,
and that procuring both products from the same supplier involves a maintenance cost
λ, while dealing with different suppliers increases the maintenance cost to λ + s, where
s is customer-specific. Then, whenever active customers prefer procuring both products
(e.g., because the products are complements, or because airlines cannot be viable without
operating aircraft in all relevant sizes), the above analysis applies, and L subsidizes again
the competitive product (and charges for example the full value for the bundle if λ is
constant and the goods are complements, or mimics the pricing policy with asymmetric
shopping costs if λ is proportional to s).
4 Banning loss leading
We now show that loss leading reduces consumer surplus and social welfare as well as
smaller rivals’ profits. For the sake of exposition, we consider here the scenario where
L faces a strategic rival, and focus moreover on the regime in which L attracts one-stop
shoppers and thus engages in loss leading (that is, wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL)).
Suppose L is not allowed to price below cost. We show in Appendix D that L then
keeps attracting one-stop shoppers in equilibrium. Since L’s profit function is quasi-
29See the decision of the European Commission in case No. IV/M053 - Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havil-
land (2 October 1991).
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concave and separable in rAL and rL, L maintains the total margin at the monopoly
level (rmAL) but now sells BL at cost (rL = 0); consequently, its profit is reduced to
ΠmAL = rmALF (vmAL).
Since L no longer subsidizes the competitive segment, S faces more demand: the gain
from multi-stop shopping increases from τ = wS − wL + r∗L − rS to τ = wS − wL − rS.
Maximizing its profit ΠS = rSF (τ) then leads S to charge a margin satisfying rS =
h (τ) = h (wS − wL − rS), and the equilibrium threshold thus becomes:
τ b = τ ∗ = l−1(wS − wL) > j−1(wS − wL) = τˆ ∗.
That is, S increases its market share (from τˆ ∗ to τ ∗) as well as its margin (from rˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)
to rbS ≡ h (τ ∗)) and, consequently, increases its profit by
∆ΠS = h (τ
∗)F (τ ∗)− h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗) > 0.
Banning loss leading does not affect the value of one-stop shopping, since L maintains
the same total margin, rmAL. It however encourages consumers to take advantage of multi-
stop shopping: banning loss leading forces L to compete "on the merits", which induces
those consumers with a shopping cost lower than τ ∗ to patronize both stores; in contrast,
subsidizing BL (and overcharging A by the same amount) discourages consumers with a
shopping cost exceeding τˆ ∗ (< τ ∗) from visiting S. The ban on loss leading thus benefits
consumers whose shopping cost lies between τˆ ∗ and τ ∗, since the resulting lower price
for A allows them to save τ ∗ − s. Using a revealed preference argument, it also benefits
genuine multi-stop shoppers (those with a shopping cost s < τˆ ∗), by increasing the value
of multi-stop shopping from vˆ∗AS ≡ vmAL + τˆ ∗ to v∗AS ≡ vmAL + τ ∗. Overall, a ban on loss
leading thus increases total consumer surplus by:
∆CS = (τ ∗ − τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗) +
Z τ∗
τˆ∗
(τ ∗ − s)dF (s) > 0.
Finally, fostering multi-stop shopping also enhances efficiency, since more consumers
benefit from a better distribution of B. The gain in social welfare is equal to:
∆W =
Z τ∗
τˆ∗
(wS − wL − s)dF (s),
and is positive since τˆ ∗ < τ ∗ < wS − wL. Therefore, we have:
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Proposition 4 Assume that L faces a strategic rival and would engage in loss leading.
Banning below-cost pricing then leads to an equilibrium where L maintains the same total
margin but sells the competitive good at cost; as a result, the ban increases consumer
surplus, the rival’s profit, and social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix D.
A similar analysis applies when L faces a competitive fringe. While loss leading no
longer affects rivals’ profit, it still reduces their market share and therefore distorts distri-
bution efficiency at the expense of consumers. Banning loss leading thus improves again
consumer surplus and social welfare.
As noted in the introduction, competition authorities have been reluctant to treat
loss leading as predatory pricing, and some countries have instead adopted below-cost
pricing regulations. By showing that loss leading can be used as an exploitative device, to
extract extra rents from multi-stop shoppers, rather than as an exclusionary or predatory
practice, our analysis sheds a new light on the rationale of loss leading and can thus help
placing the assessment of its anticompetitive effects on firmer ground.
5 Inter-format vs. intra-format competition
We have so far taken as given the market structure and focused on asymmetric competition
between large and small retail formats. We now consider the implications of this analysis
for retailers’ choice of format. When the founders of Aldi, the Albrecht brothers, took
over their family’s small neighborhood store in 1946, a retail cooperative was dominating
their local market. They took to selling a limited range of private label products, and
the success of this innovative approach triggered the development of the hard-discount
business model. Later on (in the 1990s), the large supermarket chains began imitating
this business model and opened their own hard-discount chains to compete head-to-head
with the existing hard discounters.30
To capture the key features of these developments, suppose that initially (period 0,
30Carrefour, Casino and Rewer, for example, have already established their own discount chains
(namely, ED, Leader Price and Penny); Auchan and Tesco are experimenting along the same lines,
whereas Asda, one of the largest retailers in the UK, has acquired the hard discounter Netto. See
Steenkamp and Kumar (2009).
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say) an incumbent L enjoys a monopoly position for the distribution of two goods, A
and B. Then in period 1, one of the potential entrants, S, innovates and comes up with
a new retail format which, by focusing on a limited product range (good B), confers a
comparative advantage in that product range (wS > wL), although the product range is
so limited that one-stop shoppers will never patronize it (wˆAL (wS, wL) < wAL). Finally,
in period 2, the incumbent and the other potential entrants can imitate the innovation
and open a store with the new format.
Let γ denote the fixed cost of opening a small store. In period 1 the innovator will
open a small store, even if it anticipates subsequent entry in period 2, as long as γ <
Πˆ∗S = ∆ˆ∗ ≡ h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗); note that entry is not only profitable for the innovator, but it
also increases L’s profit by the same amount ∆ˆ∗. Consider now period 2. If the innovator
already opened a small store, no other entrant will do so, since head-to-head competition
would then eliminate the margin on B. Lmay however benefit from opening its own small
store since, while this drives the margins of the small stores down to zero, it allows L to
extract more surplus than before from multi-stop shoppers: ∆∗ ≡ h (τ ∗)F (τ∗) > ∆ˆ∗;
therefore, L will open its own small store whenever γ < ∆∗ − ∆ˆ∗.
Alternatively, if mergers were allowed, L could acquire S, in which case L and S could
together generate a total profit
ΠL +ΠS = rAL (F (vAL)− F (τ)) + (rS + rA)F (τ)
= rALF (vAL) + (rS − rL)F (τ) ,
where the second line is derived by using rA = rAL − rL. It is thus optimal to charge
rAL = rmAL and rL − rS = −h (τ ∗), where τ ∗ = l−1(wS − wL), and in this way L and S
generate a joint profit equal to Π∗L = ΠmAL+∆∗. So, this scenario yields the same profit as
opening a small store competing with S,31 but saves the cost γ of opening another store.
By construction, the profit achieved by the merged entity exceeds the joint profit of L
and S in the other scenario; we thus have ∆∗ > 2∆ˆ∗, or ∆∗ − ∆ˆ∗ > ∆ˆ∗. Therefore:
Proposition 5 Suppose γ < ∆ˆ∗
³
< ∆∗ − ∆ˆ∗
´
. Then:
31Loss leading however need not arise in case of a merger: while one-stop shoppers face the same total
margin rmAL in both scenarios, in the merger case L can not only use rA, but also rS to charge a total of
rmAL + τ
∗ to multi-stop shoppers; charging for instance rA = rmAL, rL = 0 and rS = wS − wL − τ∗ > 0
would do, and would not involve any loss leading.
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• S opens a small store when the innovation becomes available in period 1;
• either L merges with S, if this is allowed, or opens another small store when the
innovation can be imitated in period 2.
Note that we ignored here the possibility for new entrants to open their own large
stores. Since head-to-head competition then drives prices down to cost for both goods,
this is not interesting on a stand-alone basis. However, if the entrant already operates
a small store, opening a large store as well eliminates loss leading, which increases the
profit of the small store from ∆ˆ∗ to ∆∗. Setting-up the large store in period 1 (that is,
at the same time as the small store) moreover prevents the incumbent from opening its
own small store in the following period (as this would lead to head-to-head competition
for both one-stop and multi-stop shoppers). For this possibility to be attractive, however,
the set-up cost of a large store should not exceed
³
∆∗ − ∆ˆ∗
´
+ δ∆∗, where δ denotes the
discount rate.
Remark: location choices. Our framework can also yield some insights for location
choices. For example, suppose that locating the stores closer to each other reduces the
additional shopping cost for multi-stop shoppers (so that while one-stop shoppers still face
a cost s, multi-stop shoppers only incur (1 + μ) s, where μ < 1). Our analysis suggests
that both firms benefit from such a move, as their profits become, respectively, ΠL =
rALF (vAL) − rLF (τ/μ) and ΠS = rSF (τ/μ). Accounting for consumers’ shopping cost
thus creates a motive for reducing the distance between (rival) stores.
Remark: entry in adjacent markets. Similar insights apply to entry decisions in ad-
jacent markets. Suppose for example that firm L initially enjoys a monopoly over some
platform (good A), and that firm S invents a new application (good B) for that platform.
Firm L may then benefit from entering as well in market B — even with a less effective
alternative (wL < wS), not only to increase the value of the platform (by forcing S to
offer a better deal on the application, as in Farrell and Katz (2000)), but also to dis-
criminate consumers according to their shopping/adoption costs. Conversely, S may also
benefit from entering market A, even if this creates head-to-head competition for one-stop
shoppers, as it removes L’s incentive to engage in loss leading.
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6 Robustness
So far, we used a simple setting in L competes only on specific product segments (market
B) and enjoys a monopoly position in others (market A); loss leading then allows L
to better exploit its market power and charge higher prices to multi-stop shoppers in
the monopolized segments. Furthermore, while we allowed for general distributions of
shopping costs, we assumed that consumers’ valuations were homogeneous. We describe
here several extensions, showing that our insights still apply whenever one-stop shoppers
favor the large retailer(s). We first introduce heterogeneity in consumer valuations, which
makes the aggregate demand for A or B more sensitive to prices, but may also attenuate
the intensity of competition in market B if L and S offer differentiated varieties. We then
introduce (imperfect) competition in market A.
Introducing heterogeneous valuations in the competitive market does not affect our
analysis as long as most one-stop shoppers prefer patronizing L, and buy both goods
from it, to patronizing S: as before, keeping rAL constant, reducing rL and increasing
rA does not affect them, and can only transform some multi-stop shoppers into one-stop
shoppers, which benefits L as long as rL > 0; therefore, in equilibrium L prices BL below
cost. To illustrate this, we present in Appendix E a simple setting in which L and S offer
differentiated varieties and preferences are distributed in such a way that some consumers
may prefer BL to BS, while others have the reverse ranking, but one-stop shoppers prefer
the bundle A − BL to consuming BS only. This setting applies for example to the case
where S (a specialist store, say) offers a better quality; loss leading then arises whenever
at least some consumers care sufficiently about quality and engage in multi-stop shopping.
The setting also applies to the case of a platform (A) and its applications (BL and BS).
Introducing heterogeneous valuations for A makes its demand elastic, which limits L’s
ability to raise prices in this segment; this may make loss leading less attractive, since
its purpose is precisely to earn more from multi-stop shoppers on this segment. Likewise,
(imperfect) competition among large retailers curbs their capacity to charge high prices
on A and may also discourage the use of loss leading as an exploitative device. To check
the robustness of our analysis, we present in Appendix F a variant where consumers
are distributed along a Hotelling line: specifically, a consumer located at x obtains a
utility uA − x − pA = wA − rA − x, where x is distributed according to a cumulative
distribution function G (·), with density g (·), so as to allow for a general elastic demand
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function. One-stop shoppers are thus willing to patronize L if s ≤ vAL−x or, equivalently,
x ≤ xAL (s) ≡ vAL − s, and prefer this to patronizing S as long as x ≤ xˆ ≡ vAL − vS. As
before, consumers prefer multi-stop shopping to patronizing L as long as s ≤ τ ; however,
they now prefer this to patronizing S only if the additional value from consuming A offsets
the extra shopping cost:
s ≤ vA − x ⇐⇒ x ≤ xA (s) ≡ vA − s.
Therefore, as long as L attracts some one-stop shoppers (vAL > vS) and S attracts some
multi-stop shoppers (τ > 0), then (see Figure 2):
• consumers with s < τ buy A from L and BS from S if x < xA (s) (region DAS), and
only BS otherwise (region DS);
• consumers with τ < s < vAL and x < xAL (s) buy both A and BL from L (region
DAL), and otherwise buy either BS only (if s ≤ vS) or nothing (if s > vS).
x
Svτ
ALD
xˆ
0
ASD
ALv
SD
s
)(sxx AL=
)(sxx A= Buy only BS
Buy A and BS Buy A and BL
Do not buy
Figure 2: Heterogeneous valuations for A
We show that, while the price sensitivity of the demand for A now limits L’ margins
(on A as well as on the assortment A−BL), L still adopts a loss-leading strategy whenever
it attracts (some) one-stop shoppers. As before, pricing BL below cost, and increasing
the price of A so as to maintain rAL unchanged, does not affect one-stop shoppers but
allows L to extract more surplus from multi-stop shoppers. While this strategy may now
induce some consumers to stop buying A, the analysis shows that, as long as the inverse
hazard rates h (·) and k (·) ≡ G (·) /g (·) are increasing, multi-stop shoppers are actually
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less price-sensitive than one-stop shoppers;32 as a result, L aims again at charging greater
margins on them, and the loss-leading strategy remains profitable.
Finally, we show that similar insights apply when L competes with another large
retailer, L2, located at the other end of the Hotelling line. This yields:
Proposition 6 Suppose consumers have heterogeneous valuations for A and/or another
large retailer competes à la Hotelling. Then, in any equilibrium in which L attracts some
one-stop shoppers, it adopts a loss-leading pricing strategy to extract more surplus from
multi-stop shoppers.
Proof. See Appendix F.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a new rationale for the adoption of loss leading and highlights its
harmful impact on retail competition and consumers in the absence of efficiency justi-
fications, thus giving support to small rivals’ complaints and competition concerns.33 It
identifies two key drivers: asymmetry in the product range and heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ shopping patterns.34 The analysis also supports the expressed doubts about the
exclusionary motive of the practice, and stresses instead its role as an exploitative de-
vice. Yet, this exploitative use of loss leading harms consumers and society as well as the
32Increasing rA by drA uniformly decreases marginal consumers’ thresholds xA (s), xˆ and xAL (s) by
drA; the conclusion then follows from the fact that these thresholds are higher for multi-stop shoppers
(xA (s)) than for one-stop shoppers (xˆ and xAL (s)) — see Figure 2.
33Chambolle (2005) also studies asymmetric competition between a large retailer and a smaller one, in
a different setting in which both retailers are equally efficient, but the majority of consumers are closer to
the smaller store, and travel costs are too large for multi-stop shopping; the large retailer then never uses
the competitive good as a loss leader, but can instead use in this way the monopolized good, in which
case this can benefit consumers as well as society. This is in line with the observation that in practice,
concerns are voiced when loss leaders are chosen among the staples offered by the smaller retailers.
34We have focused here on consumer shopping costs, which appear as a key factor for routine, repeated
purchases. Other dimensions may be relevant for other types of purchases; for example, for less frequent,
high value purchases, information and search costs may play a more important role — and customers with
lower search costs are again likely to visit more stores. It would be interesting to study whether these
alternative sources of underlying heterogeneity yield similar or distinct insights.
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smaller rivals, which may provide a rationale for antitrust enforcement.35
While the insights are quite robust to variations in cost and demand conditions, policy
measures should also take into account potential efficiency justifications, and empirical
studies are needed to assess the resulting balance. We have furthermore restricted at-
tention to individual unit demands, which appears reasonable for groceries and other
day-to-day purchases, and also assumed away any correlation between consumers’ val-
uations for the goods and their shopping costs; whether our insights apply to market
environments where consumers’ individual demands are elastic, or underlying character-
istics (e.g., wealth) affect both shopping costs and willingness to pay, is left to future
research. Likewise, our framework focuses on small retailers that have lower cost or offer
better quality, such as hard discounters or specialist stores, but does not account for other
categories of small stores, such as convenience stores, that face higher costs (and charge
higher prices) but allow consumers to save on shopping costs; we leave to future research
the analysis of pricing strategies in such instances.
Finally, while the analysis focuses mainly on retail markets, our insights apply as well
to industries where (i) a firm, enjoying substantial market power in one segment, competes
with more efficient rivals in other segments, and (ii) procuring these products from the
same supplier generates customer-specific benefits. They also apply to complementary
products, such as platforms and applications. While some of these industries have hosted
heated antitrust cases focusing on predatory pricing or related conduct, our analysis
provides an alternative rationale for below-cost pricing based on exploitation rather than
exclusion.
35Allain and Chambolle (2005) and Rey and Vergé (2010) note however that below-cost pricing regu-
lations can allow manufacturers to impose price floors on their retailers, in which case they can be used
to better exert market power or to reduce interbrand as well as intrabrand competition; banning loss
leaders may then have a perverse effect on consumer welfare.
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Online Appendix
Not for publication
A Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose first that vAL ≥ wS, that is, rAL ≤ wAL − wS ("regime L"). We first show that,
without loss of generality, we can focus on prices such that τ ∈ [0, vAL]. If τ > vAL (i.e.,
wS − wL + rL > wAL − rAL, or rL > r0L ≡ (wAL − rA − (wS − wL)) /2), there are no
one-stop shoppers: active consumers buy A from L and BS from S, and do so as long as
2s < vA +wS; however, keeping rA constant, decreasing rL to r0L such that τ
0 = v0AL does
not affect the number of active consumers (since vA does not change), who still visit both
stores as before. If instead τ < 0 (i.e., rL < −wS−wL), there are no multi-stop shoppers:
active consumers only visit L, and do so as long as s < vAL = wAL−rAL; however, keeping
rAL constant, increasing rL to r0L = − (wS − wL) yields τ 0 = 0 without affecting consumer
behavior. The condition τ ≥ 0 moreover ensures that prospective multi-stop shoppers
are indeed willing to buy A on a stand-alone basis: wS ≤ vAL = wAL − rA − rL implies
rA ≤ wAL − wS − rL = wAL − wL − τ < wA.
Thus, consumers whose shopping cost lies in [0, τ ] buy A from L (and BS from S),
whereas those with a shopping cost in [τ , vAL] buy both A and BL from L. Using vAL =
wAL− rAL and τ = wS −wL+ rL, L’s optimization program within regime L can thus be
expressed as:
max
rAL,rL
ΠL (rAL, rL) = rALF (wAL − rAL)− rLF (wS − wL + rL) ,
subject to rAL ≤ wAL − wS
(7)
where ΠL (rAL, rL) is additively separable and moreover strictly quasi-concave36 in rAL
and rL. L’s optimization program can thus be decomposed into:
max
rAL
rALF (wAL − rAL) ,
s. t. rAL ≤ wAL − wS
which leads to rAL = min {rmAL, wAL − wS} and vAL = max {vmAL, wS}, and
min
rL
rLF (wS − wL + rL) ,
36The derivative w.r.t. rAL is of the form f(wAL− rAL)φ (rAL), where φ (rAL) ≡ h(wAL− rAL)− rAL
is strictly decreasing. A similar reasoning applies below to the other profit functions of L and S.
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which yields the first-order condition:
r∗L = −h(wS − wL + r∗L) = −h(τ ∗) < 0. (8)
Using r∗L = τ ∗ − (wS − wL) = −h(τ ∗), the optimal threshold τ ∗ is given by:
τ ∗ ≡ l−1(wS − wL) > 0. (9)
Note that this threshold satisfies τ ∗ < vmAL. To see this, take instead vAL and τ as control
variables and rewrite L’s profit as:
ΠL(vAL, τ) = rALF (vAL)− rLF (τ)
= (wAL − vAL)F (vAL) + (wS − wL − τ)F (τ) .
Then we have vmAL = argmaxv (wAL − v)F (v) > argmaxv (wS − wL − v)F (v) = τ ∗,
since wAL ≥ l (wS) (> wS ≥ wS − wL).
Suppose now that vAL < wS, that is, rAL > wAL − wS ("regime S"). L then only
attracts multi-stop shoppers, who buy A from it as long as s ≤ vA = wA − rA. L thus
obtains:
ΠL = rAF (vA) = rAF (wA − rA),
which is maximal for rmA and v
m
A = wA − rmA , characterized by:
rmA = h(v
m
A ), v
m
A = l
−1 (wA) .
L’s profit in regime S is thus at most:
ΠmA ≡ rmAF (vmA ).
As already noted, regime L is clearly preferable when vmAL ≥ wS, since it then gives L
more profit than the monopolistic level ΠmAL, which itself is greater than ΠmA :
ΠmAL = maxr rF (wAL − r) > maxr rF (wA − r) = Π
m
A ,
since wAL > wA. We now show that regime L, and the associated loss-leading strategy,
remains profitable when wAL ≥ wS > vmAL, where it involves r∗L < 0 and r˜∗AL = wAL−wS.
To see this, fixing r˜∗AL and using rA rather than rL as the optimization variable, the margin
on BL and the shopping cost threshold can be expressed as:
rL = r˜∗AL − rA = wAL − wS − rA, τ = wS − wL + rL = wAL − wL − rA = wA − rA.
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The maximum profit achieved in regime L, Π˜∗L, can then be written as:
Π˜∗L = r˜
∗
AL (F (v˜
∗
AL)− F (τ ∗)) + r∗AF (τ ∗)
= (wAL − wS) (F (wS)− F (τ ∗)) + r∗AF (τ ∗)
= max
rA
{(wAL − wS) (F (wS)− F (wA − rA)) + rAF (wA − rA)}
≥ (wAL − wS) (F (wS)− F (wA − rmA )) + rmAF (wA − rmA )
= (wAL − wS) (F (wS)− F (vmA )) +ΠmA .
Since wS > vmAL = l
−1(wAL) > l−1(wA) = vmA , Π˜∗L ≥ ΠmA whenever wAL ≥ wS.
Conversely, when wAL < wS, then L can indeed achieve ΠmA in regime S (e.g., rL = 0
and rA = rmA satisfy rAL = r
m
A > 0 > wAL − wS, and thus vAL < wS), and we have:
Π˜∗L = (wAL − wS) (F (wS)− F (wA − r˜∗A)) + r˜∗AF (wA − r˜∗A)
< r˜∗AF (wA − r˜∗A)
≤ ΠmA ,
where the first inequality stems from wS > wAL (> wA − r˜∗A).
Finally, in the limit case where wAL = wS, using BL as a loss leader amounts to mo-
nopolizing product A. Offering vAL = wS requires rAL = wAL−vAL = 0, or rA = −rL, and
the optimal subsidy thus maximizes −rLF (τ) = −rLF (wS − wL + rL) = rAF (wA − rA).
Therefore, in both cases L obtains (from multi-stop shoppers) the monopoly margin on
A, and makes no profit (from one-stop shoppers) on the bundle A − BL (since either it
charges them rAL = 0, or they go to S). Finally, while the loss-leading strategy may yield
a lower price for BL (in the monopolization scenario, L may actually stop carrying BL),
this does not affect multi-stop shoppers (who do not buy BL from L), whereas one-stop
shoppers are indifferent between buying A and BL from L or BS only from S.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We derive here the conditions under which the loss leading outcome (rˆ∗AL = r
m
AL and rˆ
∗
L =
−rˆ∗S = −h (τˆ ∗), where τˆ ∗ = j−1 (wS − wL)) forms a Nash equilibrium, before checking the
uniqueness of the equilibrium. To attract one-stop shoppers, L must offer a better value
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than S:37
vmAL ≥ vˆ∗S ≡ wS − h (τˆ ∗) . (10)
This condition implies vmAL ≥ vˆ∗S > vˆ∗S − vˆ∗L = τˆ ∗, which in turn implies wAL > wS:
wAL = l (vmAL) ≥ l (vˆ∗S) = vˆ∗S + h (vˆ∗S) = wS − h (τˆ ∗) + h (vˆ∗S) > wS.
Moreover, while L has no incentive to exclude its rival, since it earns more profit
than a pure monopolist, S may want to attract one-stop shoppers by reducing rS so
as to offer vS ≥ vmAL. Such a deviation allows S to attract all consumers (one-stop
or multi-stop shoppers) with shopping costs s ≤ vS and thus yields a profit ΠdS (vS) ≡
rSF (vS) = (wS − vS)F (vS). A simple revealed argument yields argmaxv ΠdS (v) ≤ vmAL ≡
argmaxv (wAL − v)F (v), since wS < wAL; as ΠdS (vS) is quasi-concave in vS, increasing
vS further above vmAL would thus reduce S’s profit. It is therefore optimal for S to offer
precisely vdS = v
m
AL (or slightly above v
m
AL, if one-stop shoppers are indifferent between the
two stores in this case), which gives S a profit equal to ΠdS (vmAL) = (wS − vmAL)F (vmAL).
The loss-leading outcome is immune to such a deviation if and only if
Πˆ∗S ≡ h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗) ≥ ΠˆdS ≡ (wS − vmAL)F (vmAL). (11)
This condition can be further written as:
Ψ (wAL;wS) ≡ (wS − vmAL)F (vmAL) ≤ Πˆ∗S, (12)
where vmAL = l
−1(wAL) and thus satisfies vmAL + h (v
m
AL) = wAL. Therefore:
∂Ψ
∂wAL
(wAL;wS) = ((wS − vmAL) f(vmAL)− F (vmAL))
dvmAL
dwAL
= (wS − vmAL − h(vmAL))
f(vmAL)
1 + h0(vmAL)
= (wS − wAL)
f(vmAL)
1 + h0(vmAL)
.
It follows that, in the range wAL ≥ wS, Ψ (wAL;wS) decreases with wAL (and strictly so for
wAL > wS). Thus, condition (11) amounts to wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL), where wˆAL (wS, wL)
is the unique solution to Ψ(wAL;wS) = Πˆ∗S. To show that this solution exists and
37As before, this is equivalent to wAL −wL − rˆ∗A = vmAL − vˆ∗L ≥ vˆ∗S − vˆ∗L = τˆ
∗ (> 0), which implies that
multi-stop shoppers are indeed willing to buy A when visiting L. Moreover, this condition also implies
vmAL > vˆ
∗
S − vˆ∗L = τˆ
∗ (> 0).
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lies above wS, note first that Ψ becomes negative for wAL > l (wS) (since then vmAL =
l−1 (wAL) > wS), and that for wAL = wS, Ψ (wAL;wS) = (wAL − vmAL)F (vmAL) = ΠmAL =
maxv (wAL − v)F (v); sincewAL > wS−wL+rˆ∗L, this exceeds Πˆ∗S = maxτ (wS − wL + rˆ∗L − τ)F (τ).
Finally, in the range wAL > wS (> wS − vˆ∗L), a simple revealed argument yields:
τˆ ∗ = argmax
v
(wS − vˆ∗L − τ)F (τ) < vmAL = argmaxv (wAL − v)F (v) .
Therefore, (11), which is equivalent to:
vmAL ≥ wS −
h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗)
F (vmAL)
, (13)
implies (10). The two conditions (10) and (11) thus boil down to wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL).
It remains to show that wˆAL (wS, wL) increases with wS. Differentiating wˆAL (wS, wL)
with respect to wS yields:
∂wˆAL
∂wS
=
∂Ψ
∂wS
− ∂Πˆ
∗
S
∂wS
− ∂Ψ∂wAL
,
where the denominator is positive in the relevant range, whereas the numerator is equal
to:
∂Ψ
∂wS
− ∂Πˆ
∗
S
∂wS
= F (vmAL)−
d (h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗))
dτˆ ∗
∂τˆ ∗
∂wS
= F (vmAL)−
1 + h0 (τˆ ∗)
1 + 2h0 (τˆ ∗)
F (τˆ ∗) ,
which is positive since vmAL > τˆ
∗.
We now show that no other equilibrium exists when wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL). First, we
turn to regime S, in which one-stop shoppers patronize S (vAL < vS), and show that there
is no such equilibrium when wAL > wS. In this regime, L faces only a demand F (vA)
for A from multi-stop shoppers, where vA = wA − rA, and thus makes a profit equal to
rAF (vA). L could however deviate and attract one-stop shoppers by reducing rL (keeping
rA and thus vA constant) so as to offer v0AL = vS (or slightly above vS). Doing so would
not change the number of multi-stop shoppers, since τ 0 = vS − v0L = v0AL− v0L = v0A = vA,
and L would obtain the same margin, rA, from those consumers. But it would now attract
one-stop shoppers (those for which vA ≤ s ≤ vAL = vS), from which L could earn a total
margin r0AL = wAL − v0AL = wAL − vS = wAL −wS + rS. Since any candidate equilibrium
requires rS ≥ 0, the deviation would be profitable when wAL > wS.
Second, consider the boundary between the two regimes, in which one-stop shoppers
are indifferent between visiting L or S (vAL = vS). Note that there must exist some
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active consumers, since either retailer can profitably attract consumers by charging a
small positive margin; therefore, we must have vAL = vS > 0. Suppose that all active
consumers are multi-stop shoppers (in which case L only sells A while S sells BS to all
consumers), which requires vAL = vS ≤ τ . Applying the same logic as in the beginning
of Appendix A, we can without loss of generality focus on the case vAL = vS = τ . It is
then profitable for L to transform some multi-stop shoppers into one-stop shoppers, by
reducing its margin on BL to r0L = wL − ε > 0 and increasing rA by ε, so as to keep vAL
constant: doing so does not affect the total number of active consumers, but transforms
those whose shopping cost lies between τ 0 = vS−v0L = τ−ε and τ into one-stop shoppers.
While L obtains the same margin on them (since r0AL = rAL), it now obtains a higher
margin r0A > rA on the remaining multi-stop shoppers.
Therefore, some consumers must visit a single store, and by assumption must be
indifferent between visiting either store (vAL = vS). Suppose now some one-stop shoppers
visit S. Since S can avoid making losses, we must then have rS ≥ 0. But then, vAL = vS
implies rAL = rS + wAL − wS > 0 and, thus, it would be profitable for L to reduce rAL
slightly, so as to attract all one-stop shoppers. Therefore, all one-stop shoppers must go
to L if rAL > 0. Conversely, we must have rS ≤ 0, otherwise S would benefit from slightly
reducing its margin so as to attract all one-stop shoppers. Therefore, in any candidate
equilibrium such that vAL = vS > 0, either:
• There are some multi-stop shoppers (i.e. τ > 0) and thus rS = 0; but then, slightly
increasing rS would allow S to keep attracting some multi-stop shoppers and obtain
a positive profit, a contradiction.
• Or, all consumers buy both products from L, which requires rL ≤ rS− (wS − wL) ≤
− (wS − wL) < 0. But then, increasing rL to r0L = rS − (wS − wL) + ε and reducing
rA by the same amount (so as to keep rAL constant) would lead those consumers
with s < τ 0 = ε to buy BS from S, allowing L to avoid granting them the subsidy
rL.
It follows that there is no equilibrium such that vAL = vS.
Finally, loss leading (in which L not only offers, but actually sells below cost) can
only arise when L sells to one-stop shoppers, which thus requires vAL ≥ vS. But this
cannot be an equilibrium when wAL < wˆAL (wS, wL), since: (i) in the range vAL > vS, the
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only such candidate is the above described loss-leading outcome, which requires wAL ≥
wˆAL (wS, wL); and (ii) as just discussed, no equilibrium exists in the boundary case vAL =
vS.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Stackelberg leadership. Suppose that L benefits from a first-mover advantage: it sets its
prices first, and then, having observed these prices, S sets its own price. Retail prices are
often strategic complements, and it is indeed the case here for S in the B segment: as
noted before, S’s best response, rˆS (rL), increases with rL. Thus, in the case of "normal
competition" in marketB, L would exploit its first-mover advantage by increasing its price
for BL, so as to encourage its rival to increase its own price and relax the competitive
pressure. In contrast, here L has an incentive to decrease rL even further. This leads S
to decrease its own price, which allows L to raise the price for A. To see this, note that
L’s Stackelberg profit from a loss-leading strategy can be written as:
ΠSL (rL) = Π
m
AL − rLF (τˆ (rL)) = ΠmAL − rLF (wS − wL + rL − rˆS (rL)) .
Denoting by rSL the optimal Stackelberg margin and using rˆS (rˆ
∗
L) = rˆ
∗
S, where rˆ
∗
L and rˆ
∗
S
are the equilibrium margins when L moves simultaneously with S, we have:
−rSLF
¡
wS − wL + rSL − rˆS
¡
rSL
¢¢
≥ −rˆ∗LF (wS − wL + rˆ∗L − rˆS (rˆ∗L))
≥ −rSLF
¡
wS − wL + rSL − rˆ∗S
¢
,
where the second inequality stems from the fact that rˆ∗L constitutes L’s best response to
r∗S. Since −rSL > 0 and F (·) and rˆS (·) are both increasing, this in turn implies rSL ≤ rˆ∗L.
This inequality is moreover strict, since (using τˆ (rˆ∗L) = τˆ
∗):¡
ΠSL
¢0
(rˆ∗L) = −F (τˆ ∗)− rˆ∗Lf (τˆ ∗) (1− rˆ0S (rˆ∗L)) = rˆ∗Lf (τˆ ∗) rˆ0S (rˆ∗L) < 0.
Thus, L sells the competitive productBL further below-cost, compared with what it would
do in the absence of a first-mover advantage: rSL < rˆ
∗
L.
Entry accommodation. Suppose now that the presence of S is uncertain. To capture
this possibility, assume that S incurs a fixed cost for entering the market, γ, which is ex
ante distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Fγ (·), and consider the
following timing:
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• In stage 1, L chooses its prices.
• In stage 2, the entry cost is realized, and S chooses whether to enter; if it enters, it
then sets its own price.
If entry were certain, maximizing its Stackelberg profit would lead L to adopt rSL. But
now, S enters only when its best response profit, ΠˆS (rL), exceeds the realized cost γ,
which occurs with probability ρ (rL) ≡ Fγ
³
ΠˆS (rL)
´
. L’s ex ante profit is therefore equal
to
ΠˆSL (rL) = Π
m
AL + ρ (rL)Π
S
L (rL) .
The optimal margin, rˆSL, thus satisfies
ρ
¡
rˆSL
¢
ΠSL
¡
rˆSL
¢
≥ ρ
¡
rSL
¢
ΠSL
¡
rSL
¢
≥ ρ
¡
rSL
¢
ΠSL
¡
rˆSL
¢
,
which implies
ρ
¡
rˆSL
¢
≥ ρ
¡
rSL
¢
.
Since Fγ and ΠˆS are both increasing in rL, so is ρ and thus rˆSL ≥ rSL. This inequality is
moreover strict, since³
ΠˆSL
´0 ¡
rSL
¢
= ρ0
¡
rSL
¢
ΠSL
¡
rSL
¢
+ ρ
¡
rSL
¢ ¡
ΠSL
¢0 ¡rSL¢ = ρ0 ¡rSL¢ΠSL ¡rSL¢ > 0.
Therefore, when L’s comparative advantage leads it to adopt a loss-leading strategy, it
limits the subsidy on B so as to increase the likelihood of entry: rˆSL > r
S
L.
D Proof of Proposition 4
In the equilibrium where L attracts one-stop shoppers in the absence of a ban, Lmust offer
a higher value than S: vAL = vmAL > vˆ
∗
S = wS − rˆ∗S, and S must moreover not be tempted
to deviate and attract one-stop shoppers, which boils down to Πˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ ∗) ≥
ΠˆdS = (wS − vmAL)F (vmAL). If L keeps attracting one-stop shoppers (i.e., vAL > vS) when
loss leading is banned, then the unique candidate equilibrium is rAL = rmAL, rL = 0 and
rbS = h (τ
∗), where τ ∗ = l−1 (wS − wL).
We show now this candidate equilibrium prevails when loss-leading would arise if
below-cost pricing were allowed. Note that, since S increases its price (i.e., rbS = h (τ
∗) >
rˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)), it offers less value (vS = vbS ≡ wS − rbS < vˆ∗S), and thus L indeed attracts
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one-stop shoppers: vAL = vmAL > (vˆ
∗
S >) v
b
S. Furthermore, as S must again offer at least
vS = vAL to attract one-stop shoppers, it still cannot obtain more than ΠˆdS by deviating
in this way. Therefore, since S now obtains more profit (Π∗S ≡ h (τ ∗)F (τ ∗) > Πˆ∗S =
h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ ∗)), it is less tempted to deviate: Π∗S >
³
Πˆ∗S >
´
ΠˆdS. It follows that the condi-
tions for sustaining the above equilibrium are less stringent than that for the loss-leading
equilibrium.
E Product differentiation in the competitive market
We show that our main insights apply when consumers vary in their relative preferences
over BL and BS. For example, suppose BL is a "standard" variety generating a homo-
geneous utility uL, whereas BS, a better variety supplied by specialist stores, yields a
utility uS + θq; θ ∈ [0, 1] thus characterizes the consumer preference for quality and is
distributed according to a c.d.f Φ(·) with density function φ(·), whereas q measures the
degree of consumer heterogeneity. For the sake of exposition, we consider here the case
where BS is supplied by a competitive fringe and assume that:
• S provides better value for at least some quality-oriented consumers: wS + q > wL;
we allow however for wL > wS, in which case L offers higher value than S for less
quality-oriented consumers.
• all one-stop shoppers favor L: vAL ≥ wS + q.
As before, consumers are willing to patronize L if s ≤ vAL, and prefer multi-stop
shopping to one-stop shopping if
s ≤ wS + θq − vL = τ + θq,
where τ = wS − wL + rL. L thus earns a profit
ΠL = rALDAL(rAL)− rLDAS (rL)
where DAL(rAL) = F (vAL) and DAS (rL) =
Z 1
0
F (τ + θq)φ(θ)dθ. The loss leading logic of
the baseline model applies again here: since vAL = wAL− rAL and τ = wS −wL + rL, L’s
profit is separable in rAL and rL, and still charges the price on BL below-cost.
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While we presented this example in terms of "vertical" quality differentiation, the
same analysis applies to "horizontal" differentiation, with utilities for BL and BS of the
form uL + (1− θ) q and uS + θq; the only difference is that, since consumers have now
heterogeneous valuations for BL as well, the above demands become:
DAL (rAL) =
Z 1
0
F (vAL + (1− θ) q)φ(θ)dθ,DAS (rL) =
Z 1
0
F (τ + (2θ − 1) q)φ(θ)dθ.
F Proof of Proposition 6
F.1 Local Monopolies with heterogeneous preferences on A
We show that introducing an elastic demand in market A does not preclude the large
retailer from adopting a loss-leading strategy, so as to extract additional surplus from
multi-stop shoppers. We focus on the large retailer’s best response to the strategies of
the smaller retailer(s); thus, what follows applies equally to the case of a strategic rival
and that of a competitive fringe.
L’s profit can be written as (see Figure 1):
ΠL = rALDAL + rADAS = rAL
Z vAL
τ
G (xAL (s)) f (s) ds+ rA
Z τ
0
G (xA (s)) f (s) ds.
To characterize the equilibrium values of rL and rAL, consider first a modification of rA
by dr, adjusting rL by −dr so as to keep rAL constant. Such a change does not affect the
behavior of one-stop shoppers (it has no impact on vAL and xAL (s)), but (see Figure 2):
• It affects multi-shop shoppers: for s < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between
buying A from L or patronizing S only becomes x = xA (s)− dr; therefore, L loses
g (xA (s)) dr consumers, on which it no longer earns the margin rA. L however
increases its margin by dr on the mass G (xA (s)) of consumers that buy A. Thus,
the overall impact of such an adjustment on multi-stop shoppers is equal toZ τ
0
[G (xA (s))− rAg (xA (s))]f (s) dsdr.
• In addition, it alters the choice between one-stop and multi-stop shopping: those
consumers for which s ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xA (s) turn to one-stop shopping and
now buy B as well as A from L1, which (noting that xA (τ) = xˆ) brings a gain
rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
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These effects must cancel out in equilibrium, which yieldsZ τ
0
[rA − k (xA (s))] g (xA (s)) f (s) ds = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) .
Likewise, adjusting slightly rAL by dr, keeping rA constant (and thus changing rL by dr
as well) does not affect the behavior of multi-stop shoppers (it has no impact on vAS and
xA (s)), but:
• It affects one-stop shoppers: for s > τ , the marginal shopper becomes x = xAL (s)−
dr, and the resulting change in profit isZ vAL
τ
[G (xAL (s))− rALg (xAL (s))] f (s) dsdr.
• In addition, those consumers for which s ∈ [τ , τ + dr] and x ≤ xAL (s) become
multi-stop shoppers and stop buying B from L, which (noting that xAL (τ) = xˆ)
brings a net effect −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
In equilibrium, these effects must again cancel each other, which yieldsZ vAL
τ
[rAL − k (xAL (s))] g (xAL (s)) f (s) ds = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) .
Therefore, if in equilibrium rL were non-negative, we would haveZ τ
0
[rA − k (xA (s))] g (xA (s)) f (s) ds ≥ 0 ≥
Z vAL
τ
[rAL − k (xAL (s))] g (xAL (s)) f (s) ds,
that is, rA would exceed a weighted average of k (xA (s)) for s ∈ [0, τ ], whereas rAL would
be lower than a weighted average of k (xAL (s)) for s ∈ [τ , vAL]. But since k (xA (s)) and
k (xAL (s)) decrease as s increases (k (.) increases by assumption, and both xA (s) and
xAL (s) decrease by construction), this would imply rA > rAL, a contradiction. Therefore,
in equilibrium, rL < 0.
If the shopping cost s is distributed over some interval [0, s], where s > τ to ensure
that large retailers still attract some one-stop shoppers, the first-order conditions become:Z τ
0
[rA − k (xA (s))] g (xA (s)) f (s) ds = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ,Z min{vAL,s}
τ
[rAL − k (xAL (s))] g (xAL (s)) f (s) ds = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ;
it thus suffices to replace vAL with min {vAL, s} in the above reasoning.
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F.2 Imperfect competition among large retailers
Suppose now that two large retailers, L1 and L2, facing the same costs in both markets
and offering the same variety BL, are differentiated in market A: they respectively offer
A1 and A2, located at the two ends of a Hotelling line of length X; a consumer with
preference x thus obtains a utility uA − x − pA1 = wA − rA1 − x from buying A1 and
a utility wA − rA2 − (X − x) from buying A2. We will restrict attention to symmetric
distributions (that is, the density g (·) satisfies g (x) = g (X − x)) and will focus on
(symmetric) equilibria in which: (i) the large retailers compete against each other as well
as against their smaller rivals; (ii) small retailers attract some multi-stop shoppers by
offering a value vS that exceeds the value vL offered by large retailers on the B market;
and (iii) large retailers attract some one-stop shoppers by offering them a value vAL that
exceeds vS, as well as the value vA that they offer on the A market alone.
Large retailers may compete against each other for one-stop and/or for multi-stop
shoppers. In the former case, in a symmetric equilibrium (of the form rA1L1 = rA2L2 = rAL
and rL1 = rL2 = rL) some consumers (with x = X/2) are indifferent between buying both
goods from either L1 or L2, and prefer doing so to patronizing S only; this implies (using
x = X/2, and dropping the subscripts 1 and 2 for ease of exposition):
vˆAL ≡ vAL −
X
2
≥ vS,
which is equivalent to
vˆA ≡ vA −
X
2
≥ τ = vS − vL.
Therefore, consumers with preference x = X/2 and shopping cost s < τ , who thus prefer
multi-stop shopping (that is, buying BS from S and A from either L1 or L2) to visiting L1
or L2 only, also prefer multi-stop shopping to patronizing S only (since s < τ then implies
s < vˆA). In other words, if large retailers compete for one-stop shoppers, they will also
compete for multi-stop shoppers. This observation allows us to classify the (symmetric)
candidate equilibria into two types:
• Type M : large retailers compete only for multi-stop shoppers (see Figure 3a);
• Type O: large retailers compete for one-stop shoppers as well as for multi-stop
shoppers (see Figure 3b).
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In the first type of equilibria (Figure 3a), for x = X/2 some consumers with low shop-
ping costs are indifferent between assortments A1S and A2S, and prefer those assortments
to any other option, whereas consumers with higher shopping costs patronize S only; the
relevant threshold for the shopping cost satisfies
vˆA + vS − 2s = vS − s,
that is, s = vˆA. Consumers with s < vˆA thus buy B from S and A from either L1 or
L2 (depending on whether x is smaller or larger than X/2). Conversely, consumers whose
shopping costs exceed vAL do not shop. As for consumers whose shopping costs lie between
vˆA and vAL:
• when s < τ , consumers still buy BS from S; they also buy A from L1 if x < xA (s) =
vA − s, or from L2 if x > X − xA (s);
• when s > τ :
— if x < xAL (s), consumers buy both goods from L1;
— if x > X − xAL (s), consumers buy both goods from L2;
— if xAL (s) < x < X−xAL (s), consumers patronize S if s < vS, and buy nothing
otherwise.
In the second type of equilibria (Figure 3b), all consumers with a shopping cost s < τ
buy BS from S and A from either L1 (if x < X/2) or L2 (if x > X/2), while consumers
with s > vAL buy nothing. For consumers with τ < s < vAL, then:
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• if s < vˆAL, consumers will buy both goods from either L1 (if x < X/2) or L2 (if
x > X/2);
• if vˆAL < s < vAL, consumers will buy both goods from L1 if x < xAL (s) or from L2
if x > X − xAL (s), and buy nothing otherwise.
A similar description applies when the shopping cost s is bounded, truncating as
necessary the interval for s.
We show now loss leading is still used as an exploitative device. Consider first (sym-
metric) equilibria of typeM , in which large retailers compete only for multi-stop shoppers.
In the absence of any bound on shopping costs, the demands for assortments A1L1 and
A1S in such equilibrium, where rA1L1 = rA2L2 = rAL and rL1 = rL2 = rL (and thus
rA1 = rA2 = rA), can be expressed as:
DAS =
Z τ
0
G (xˆA (s)) f (s) ds and DAL =
Z vAL
τ
G (xAL (s)) f (s) ds,
where as before τ = vS−vL and xAL (s) = vAL−max {s, vS}, and xˆA (s) ≡ vA−max {s, vˆA}
= min {X/2, xA (s) = vA − s}.
Applying the same approach as above, starting from a candidate symmetric equilib-
rium, consider first a small change dr in rA1 , adjusting rL1 by −dr so as to keep rA1L1
constant:
• For s < vˆA, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying A from L1 or
L2 is such that:
wA − (rA + dr)− x = wA − rA − (X − x) ,
or:
x =
X
2
− dr
2
.
The overall impact on L1’s profit is thus:Z vˆA
0
[G (xˆA (s))−
1
2
rAg (xˆA (s))]f (s) dsdr.
• For vˆA < s < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between buying A from L1 or
patronizing S becomes x = xA (s)− dr, and the resulting impact on profit is:Z τ
vˆA
[G (xˆA (s))− rAg (xˆA (s))]f (s) dsdr.
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• In addition, those consumers for which s ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xˆA (s) turn to one-
stop shopping and now buy B as well as A from L1, which brings an additional
profit rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have:Z τ
0
[rA − ηA (s)] gˆ (xˆA (s)) f (s) ds = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) , (14)
where (using xˆA (s) = X/2 for s ≤ vˆA):
ηA (s) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
2k (xˆA (s)) for s < vˆA
k (xˆA (s)) for s > vˆA
and gˆ (x) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
g (X/2)
2
for x = X/2
g (x) for x < X/2
.
Consider now a small change dr in rA1L1, keeping rA1 constant (and thus adjusting
rL1 by dr as well):
• for s > τ , the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (s)−dr and the impact
on the profit is Z vAL
τ
[G (xAL (s))− rALg (xAL (s))] f (s) dsdr;
• in addition, those consumers for which s ∈ [τ , τ + dr] and x ≤ xAL (s) become multi-
stop shoppers and stop buying B from L1, which brings a net loss −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
In equilibrium, we must therefore haveZ vAL
τ
[rAL − ηAL (s)] g (xAL (s)) f (s) ds = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) , (15)
where ηAL (s) ≡ k (xAL (s)).
Thus, if rL were non-negative, the two conditions (14) and (15) would implyZ τ
0
[rA − ηA (s)] gˆ (xˆA (s)) f (s) ds ≥ 0 ≥
Z vAL
τ
[rAL − ηAL (s)] g (xAL (s)) f (s) ds,
where ηA and ηAL decrease as s increases, and coincide for s = τ ; this, in turn, would
imply rA > rAL, a contradiction. A similar argument applies when the shopping cost s is
distributed over some interval [0, s].
The same approach can be used for (symmetric) equilibria of type O, in which large
retailers compete as well for one-stop shoppers. In the absence of any bound on shopping
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costs, the demands for assortments A1L1 and A1S in such equilibrium can be expressed
as
DAS =
Z τ
0
G
µ
X
2
¶
f (s) ds and DAL =
Z vAL
τ
G (xˆAL (s)) f (s) ds,
where xˆAL (s) ≡ vA −max {s, vˆAL} = min {X/2, xAL (s) = vAL − s}.
Following a small change dr in rA1, adjusting rL1 by −dr so as to keep rA1L1 constant,
we have:
• for s < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between buying A from L1 or L2
becomes X/2− dr/2;
• in addition, those consumers for which s ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xˆA (s) become one-
stop shoppers.
Therefore, in equilibrium we must haveZ τ
0
[rA − ηˆA] gˆ(
X
2
)f (s) ds = rLG
µ
X
2
¶
f (τ) ,
where ηˆA ≡ 2k (X/2) and gˆ(X/2) = g (X/2) /2.
Likewise, following a small change dr in rA1L1 , keeping rA1 constant (and thus changing
rL1 by dr as well), we have:
• for τ < s < vˆAL, the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (s)− dr/2;
• for vˆAL < s < vAL, the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (s)− dr;
• in addition, those consumers for which s ∈ [τ , τ + dr] and x ≤ xˆAL (s) become
multi-stop shoppers: they stop buying B from L1.
We must therefore haveZ vAL
τ
[rAL − ηˆAL (s)] gˆ (xˆAL (s)) f (s) ds = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ,
where
ηˆAL (s) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
2k (xˆAL (s)) for s < vˆAL
k (xˆAL (s)) for s > vˆAL
,
and gˆ (x) is defined above with xˆAL (s) = X/2 for τ ≤ s ≤ vˆAL. Thus, if rL were
non-negative, the above two conditions would imply:Z τ
0
[rA − ηˆA] gˆ(
X
2
)f (s) ds ≥ 0 ≥
Z vAL
τ
[rAL − ηˆAL (s)] gˆ (xˆAL (s)) f (s) ds,
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and a contradiction follows, since xˆAL (s) ≤ X/2, with a strict inequality for s > vˆAL, and
thus ηˆAL (s) ≤ 2k (xˆAL (s)) ≤ ηˆA, with again a strict inequality for s > vˆAL. A similar
argument applies again when the shopping cost s is distributed over some interval [0, s].
If instead s < vˆAL, then all consumers buy both goods, in which case ηˆAL (.) = ηˆA and
gˆ (xˆAL (s)) = gˆ (X/2), and rL = 0.
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